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Abstract
Background: Financial advice from experts is commonly sought during times of uncertainty. While the field of
neuroeconomics has made considerable progress in understanding the neurobiological basis of risky decision-making, the
neural mechanisms through which external information, such as advice, is integrated during decision-making are poorly
understood. In the current experiment, we investigated the neurobiological basis of the influence of expert advice on
financial decisions under risk.
Methodology/Principal Findings: While undergoing fMRI scanning, participants made a series of financial choices between
a certain payment and a lottery. Choices were made in two conditions: 1) advice from a financial expert about which choice
to make was displayed (MES condition); and 2) no advice was displayed (NOM condition). Behavioral results showed a
significant effect of expert advice. Specifically, probability weighting functions changed in the direction of the expert’s
advice. This was paralleled by neural activation patterns. Brain activations showing significant correlations with valuation
(parametric modulation by value of lottery/sure win) were obtained in the absence of the expert’s advice (NOM) in
intraparietal sulcus, posterior cingulate cortex, cuneus, precuneus, inferior frontal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus. Notably,
no significant correlations with value were obtained in the presence of advice (MES). These findings were corroborated by
region of interest analyses. Neural equivalents of probability weighting functions showed significant flattening in the MES
compared to the NOM condition in regions associated with probability weighting, including anterior cingulate cortex,
dorsolateral PFC, thalamus, medial occipital gyrus and anterior insula. Finally, during the MES condition, significant
activations in temporoparietal junction and medial PFC were obtained.
Conclusions/Significance: These results support the hypothesis that one effect of expert advice is to ‘‘offload’’ the
calculation of value of decision options from the individual’s brain.
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Introduction
Seeking advice from experts is common practice. The most
prominent situations in which people turn to experts for advice
occur under conditions of enhanced uncertainty, such as an
economic recession. During such times, people may feel unfit to
predict the consequences of their choices, and may seek the
counsel of experts to reduce the enhanced perception of risk. For
instance, when making investment decisions in a market
downturn, people often ask an expert, or a knowledgeable
colleague or friend for advice on where to invest their money.
While the field of neuroeconomics has made significant progress in
understanding the neurobiological basis of risk in decision-making
(for reviews see [1,2]), the neural impact of external information
on decision-making, such as advice from an expert, remains
unexplored. In the current experiment, we used functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neurobio-
logical basis of expert advice in a setting in which participants
made financial decisions under uncertainty and were free to
choose whether to follow or to ignore advice from a financial
expert. Individuals made a series of financial choices between a
certain payment and a lottery, while undergoing fMRI scanning.
Choices were made under two different conditions. In one
condition, advice from a financial expert was displayed, while in
the second condition, no advice was displayed (Figure 1). The
advice consisted of a recommendation from an expert economist
about which choice to make. Our framing attempted to maximize
the authoritativeness of the advice, with the purpose of creating a
high likelihood that the advice would influence decisions.
There are several possible mechanisms through which expert
advice could affect an individual’s decision-making process [3,4].
In particular, the impact of such advice may range along a
continuum from having no effect on internal decision-making
mechanisms to overriding them entirely. We hypothesized that
advice would lead to modulations of internal valuation mecha-
nisms engaged during choice, the effect of which we expected to be
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modulations might take the form of suppressing, or turning off an
individual’s valuation mechanisms entirely. This would indicate an
offloading of the burden of the decision-process to the expert. To
test this offloading hypothesis, and to investigate the nature of the
offloading process, we considered the following issues. 1) Does
expert advice influence individuals’ decisions? 2) What is the
pattern of brain activations associated with the receipt of expert
advice? 3) Is there a difference in brain activations between times
when individuals choose to follow the expert’s advice and when
they do not? And 4) Does receipt of the message change activation
patterns in brain regions associated with valuation computation
when a decision is made?
To investigate the behavioral effect of expert advice (question 1),
we compared decisions made during trials in which advice was
received (which we refer to as the MES condition) and not
received (the NOM condition). We used prospect theory [5] as a
framework for analyzing how choices were affected by the
presence of financial advice from an expert. Under this
framework, the value of the lottery is the multiplicative product
of the utility of each potential payoff and its subjectively weighted
probability, both of which are susceptible to transformations. In
particular, evidence suggests that subjects tend to overweight small
probabilities and underweight large probabilities of an event
[6,7,8,9]. In the current experiment, we investigated whether and
how probability weighting is affected by the expert’s advice.
The second question was addressed by comparing brain
activation patterns observed between the two conditions, MES
(advice present) and NOM (advice absent). While information
about the expert’s professional background and his decision
strategy were provided prior to the experiment in order to create a
basic level of trust towards the expert, the quality of such
information is not comparable to actual interactions with the
expert. The specific nature of the expert’s advice, which was
suboptimal, could only be inferred via repeated interactions
throughout the experiment. This process requires mental perspec-
tive-taking to infer the intentions and beliefs of the expert. Previous
research in the field of social cognitive neuroscience has repeatedly
Figure 1. Schematic representation and timing of MRI trial design. On each trial, participants were asked to choose between a sure win and
a lottery, either in the presence of advice from an expert (MESSAGE) or in its absence (NO MESSAGE). Advice from the expert economist was provided
on half the trials by way of placing the words ‘‘ACCEPT’’ above the option that the expert would choose and ‘‘REJECT’’ above the option that the
expert would not choose. In the NO MESSAGE condition, the expert’s advice was hidden by placing the words ‘‘UNAVAILABLE’’ above both options.
The probability of the lottery varied across seven probability conditions ranging from 1% to 99% and the amount of the sure win varied based on
decision weights estimated in a behavioral pre-scanning session using the PEST procedure. The self-paced decision period was followed by a 1-
second feedback period, which provided confirmatory information about which option was chosen by the participant. Finally, a jittered intertrial
interval that varied between 3 and 10 seconds was presented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.g001
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temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) (e.g. [10,11,12,13,14]). We therefore hypothesized that
these regions (TPJ, MPFC) would be engaged when participants
considered advice from an expert.
The third question was addressed by investigating activations
when participants followed, compared to when they ignored,
advice provided by the expert economist. Ignoring the advice of an
expert may lead to enhanced conflict during the decision process
and increase the perceived risk associated with choice. On the
other hand, following the expert’s advice can be considered a
much safer option involving less emotional and cognitive conflict.
We therefore expected non-conformity with the expert’s advice to
lead to enhanced levels of conflict and arousal. To investigate the
neurobiological basis of this effect, we probed for differential
activation patterns as a function of whether participants followed
vs. ignored advice. Based on previous research [15], we expected
brain regions associated with negative affect and risk, such as the
anterior insula and amygdala, to show such enhanced activation
when participants went against the expert’s advice.
Finally, to investigate the neurobiological basis of the influence of
expertadvice during risky decision-making, we focused on activations
in regions showing correlations with valuation and probability
computations. In agreement with the offloading hypothesis, we
expected signals reflective of value computations to be attenuated
in the presence of expert advice. According to prospect theory, value
computations reflect the multiplicative product of the utility of each
potential payoff and its subjectively weighted probability. We
expected the presence of expert advice to modulate the neural
correlates of such value computations. This would be reflected by a
reduced sensitivity to reward and probability magnitudes in regions
previously associated with reward-related computations, such as the
mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine pathways [16,17,18,19,
20,21], and in regions implicated in probability processing, such as
anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, parietal cortex
and orbitofrontal cortex [22,23,24,25,26].
Results
Behavior
Our behavioral results indicated that the expert’s advice
significantly influenced behavior. To investigate the extent to
which expert advice affected individuals’ estimated probability
weighting parameters, we employed nonlinear logistic regression
in combination with Prelec’s compound invariant form [8], a
commonly-employed specification for nonlinear probability
weighting. Group-level parameter estimates agreed well with
findings from behavioral economics (median a=0.74; b=1.59)
and were consistent with an inverted S-shape probability function.
We obtained behavioral evidence demonstrating that the presence
of the expert’s advice led to a significant increase in the curvature
of w(p) in the direction of the advice, such that participants
overweighted low probabilities and underweighted high probabil-
ities more after receiving the advice. This was indicated by a
significant estimate of d (d=20.1066; 95% Confidence interval:
[20.1592 20.054], see Figure 2). A complimentary method, using
Certainty Equivalents obtained from the staircase algorithm
employed in phase 2, yielded similar results (median a=0.8964;
b=1.561; d=20.0442 [20.1186 0.0302]). These findings
demonstrate that the presence of the expert’s advice led to a
significant change in the curvature of the probability weighting
function in the direction of the expert’s advice. Reaction time
results and proportion of trials during which expert advice was
followed and ignored are shown in Table 1.
fMRI Results
Main effect of message. To isolate areas activated during
the message condition, we investigated the main effect of the
message, contrasting presence and absence of the expert’s advice
(MES-NOM). As shown in Figure 3, structures showing significant
activations during the message condition included bilateral
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (DMPFC), as well as the caudate nucleus and anterior
insula (see Table 2). Significant deactivations were reflective of
greater responses in the NOM condition and were mainly
observed in visual areas, as well as mid cingulate cortex and
posterior insula (see Table 2).
Main effect of conformity. To probe for the effects of
conformity, we contrasted blood oxygenation-level-dependent
(BOLD) responses during trials in which participants chose to
ignore versus follow the expert’s advice in the message condition
Figure 2. Probability weighting functions estimated from
decisions in the MESSAGE and NO MESSAGE conditions. This
figure shows probability weighting functions, w(p), and individual
participants’ decision weights at each probability condition estimated
using our behavioral model. A significant difference in probability
weighting functions between the NO MESSAGE (blue line) and
MESSAGE (red line) condition was obtained. The differences indicate
that participants overweighted probabilities smaller than 20% and
underweighted probabilities greater than 80% to a greater extent in the
MES compared to the NOM condition. These results indicate that the
presence of the expert’s advice, whose decision strategy is shown in the
dotted line, had a significant effect on participants’ probability
weighting functions. A median a of 0.74 was obtained in the NO
MESSAGE condition and, importantly, the a in the MESSAGE condition
was significantly different, as indicated by a significant d of 20.1066
(P,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.g002
Table 1. Behavioral Results: Percentage of Trials in which
Advice was Followed and Ignored in each Treatment
Condition with associated Reaction Times, Average over All
Subjects.
Followed Ignored
Percentage RT Percentage RT
MES Mean 72.81 3.169 27.19 4.561
Std Error 4.07 0.244 3.45 0.883
NOM Mean 64.10 3.231 35.90 4.092
Std Error 4.07 0.226 3.45 0.468
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.t001
Expert Financial Advice
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 March 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 3 | e4957only. As shown in figure 4A, significant activations were obtained
in the left anterior insula and right globus pallidus, indicating
significant BOLD responses in these regions when subjects made
decisions independently and ignored the expert’s advice (see
Table 3). A network of structures showed activations associated
with conformity with the expert and included posterior cingulate,
frontal eye fields, superior frontal gyrus, and posterior insula, all of
which were lateralized to the right hemisphere (see Figure 4B and
Table 3). Using a separate model to extract time courses in these
regions, we confirmed that activity in regions associated with
independence increased when subjects ignored the advice of the
expert (MESignored) compared to both when they followed it
(MESfollowed) and when no advice was present (NOM), while the
opposite pattern was observed in areas associated with behavioral
conformity. Figure 4C shows the time course in the left anterior
insula.
Correlations with certain payoff and weighted value of
lotteries. We probed for brain regions showing correlations
with the weighted value of the lotteries (1000*w(p)). Because the
payoff in the event of a win was always the same, these correlations
are with w(p). Separately, we searched for brain regions with
activation correlated with the magnitude of the sure win (recall
that the amount of the sure win varied by trial). The MES and
NOM conditions were investigated separately. Of note,
parametric modulators for w(p) were orthogonalized to regressors
reflective of sure win magnitude. In the MES condition, no
significant correlations with the weighted value of the lottery were
obtained, while cuneus and middle frontal gyrus showed negative
correlations (deactivations) with the value of the sure win (see
Table 4). In the NOM condition, we found significant correlations
with the sure win in a network of structures consisting of
intraparietal sulcus, posterior cingulate cortex, cuneus and
precuneus, inferior frontal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus (see
Figure 5 and Table 4). Significant correlations with the weighted
value of the lottery were obtained in left anterior insula, anterior
cingulate cortex, thalamus, precentral gyrus, and middle occipital
gyrus (see Figure 5 and Table 4).
To consider whether the profile of the relationship between
brain activation and probability differed between MES and NOM
conditions in areas showing significant correlations with value, we
obtained separate neurobiological probability response ratios
(NPRRs) for the MES and NOM conditions. Because we did
Figure 3. Activation clusters for the contrast MESSAGE – NO MESSAGE (p,0.001). Brain regions showing significant activations during the
MESSAGE (orange) included bilateral anterior insula, right caudate nucleus, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral temporoparietal junction and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Brain regions showing significant activations during the NO MESSAGE condition (blue) included lingual gyrus,
fusiformgyrus, and left posterior insula.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.g003
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condition, we expected to find relatively flat NPRRs in the MES
condition compared to the NOM condition. This would be
reflected by significant differences between NPRRs in the two
treatments, particularly for high probabilities, during which the
expert advice was maximally different from risk neutrality or
expected value maximization. Our findings are consistent with this
hypothesis. Significantly greater responses in the NOM compared
to the MES condition were obtained in the majority of areas
showing correlations with w(p), or equivalently, with weighted
value. This indicates extensive recruitment of valuation mecha-
nisms in the absence of the expert’s advice, and attenuation
(offloading) when the expert’s advice is present. Figure 6 shows
representative NPRRs in regions showing significant correlations
with probability weighting, including anterior cingulate cortex,
dorsolateral PFC, thalamus, medial occipital gyrus and anterior
insula.
Discussion
A simple financial decision-making task involving risk was
employed in the current study to investigate the behavioral and
neural mechanisms by which financial advice, provided by an
expert economist, affected decisions under risk. Behavioral results
showed a significant effect of expert advice on probability
weighting, such that probability weighting functions changed in
the direction of the expert’s advice. The behavioral effect of expert
messages was paralleled by changes in neural activation patterns.
Of note, significant correlations with the value of the lottery were
obtained in the absence of the expert’s advice (NOM), but not
during its presence (MES). These results support the hypothesis
that one effect of expert advice is to ‘‘offload’’ calculations of the
value of alternative behavioral options that underlie decision-
making from the individual’s brain.
Attenuated recruitment of valuation mechanisms
parallels behavioral results
The significant behavioral effect of expert advice on probability
weighting was paralleled by the fMRI results. At the behavioral
level, we obtained a significant effect of the expert’s advice on the
curvature of the probability weighting function, indicated by a
significant effect of the presence of the advice on a. Neurally, this
was paralleled in two ways: 1) an attenuated activation of regions
whose BOLD responses showed significant correlations with value
in the NOM condition; and 2) significantly flattened NPRRs,
reflecting an attenuated relationship between activation level and
probabilities in regions that showed correlations with probability, in
the MES condition relative to the NOM condition. Specifically, our
results revealed that, in the absence of the expert’s advice,
participants engaged two largely separate networks involved in
valuation mechanisms. These networks were composed of regions
exhibiting correlations with two types of value, namely (a) payoff of
thesurewinand (b)weighted value of the lottery.These correlations
were attenuated when the expert’s advice was available.
These results implicate particular networks in evaluating the
different behavioral options and underline their importance in the
financial decision-making process. Regions that showed sensitivity
to payoff magnitudes of prospects in the current study have
previously been associated with decision-making under uncertain-
ty, such as the parietal cortex, including precuneus [27] and
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) [28,29]. The IPS is the putative human
homologue of LIP [30], an area in monkey parietal cortex that has
previously been demonstrated to process elements of expected
utility [28,31] and has been proposed to contain a map of the
expected utility of all possible actions [32]. In the current study,
activity in parietal regions was associated with the value of the
potential sure win. The posterior cingulate cortex/cuneus showed
similar activation patterns, such that activity in this region was
correlated with magnitude. These findings confirm and extend
Table 2. Brain Regions Showing Main Effect of Message.
L/R Structure BA Volume RL AP IS Max t
MESSAGE.NO MESSAGE
R Superior Frontal Gyrus / DMPFC 8 101 3.5 38.4 51.2 6.654
L SupramarginalGyrus / TPJ 40 37 251.7 257 31.2 4.564
R SupramarginalGyrus / TPJ 40 31 50.9 250.2 31.6 5.43
L Insula 47 29 229.4 18.2 211.9 6.894
R Insula 47 24 35.7 25 211.3 4.8
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 8 55.5 25.5 7.5 4.028
R Caudate 6 7.9 9.5 11.4 4.456
R Caudate 5 9 8.4 1.2 4.552
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 5 251.6 25.8 9 4.037
NO MESSAGE.MESSAGE
R Lingual Gyrus 18 263 1.2 281.6 23.2 210.558
L Cuneus 18 9 29 266 4 24.266
R Mid Cingulate Cortex 32 9 10.6 6.7 36.3 24.952
L FusiformGyrus 19 7 219.7 269.9 29.4 24.428
R Posterior Cingulate Cortex 30 7 12.4 250.9 10.3 24.31
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 6 58.5 235.5 23.5 4.421
L Posterior Insula 22 5 241.4 213.8 21.8 24.402
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.t002
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uncertainty [22,33,34,35]. Specifically, responses in this area have
been shown to scale with reward magnitude and predictability of
reward [36] and PCC is an integrating node of the brain’s default
network involved in processing self-referential states (e.g. [37,38])
and part of a network implicated in encoding subjective values of
rewards [33,34]. Importantly, the effect of the expert’s advice was
to attenuate these responses, which suggests that the advice, in
part, ‘‘offloaded’’ the processing of value.
The neurobiological equivalent to probability weighting
is influenced by expert advice
We also confirm the presence of nonlinear weighting of
probability, both at the behavioral, as well as the neural level in
a network of areas sensitive to probability. We show that the
degree of probability weighting can be influenced by the presence
of advice from a financial expert, both at the behavioral (Figure 1)
and, in parallel fashion, at the neural level (Figure 6). Neurally, the
Figure 4. Neural correlates of conformity were revealed in the message condition by contrasting participants’ choices to follow vs.
ignore the advice of the expert (MESfol-MESign). A. Brain regions responding when participants ignored the expert’s advice included left
anterior insula and right globus pallidus. B. Brain regions showing significant activation when participants conformed to the expert’s advice included
posterior insula, frontal eye fields and posterior cingulate, as well as two activation clusters in superior frontal gyrus (not shown here). C. The time
course in the anterior insula shows a significant increase in activation when participants decided to ignore the expert’s advice (green line) compared
to when they decided to follow it (red line), or during the absence of the expert’s advice in the NOM condition (blue line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.g004
Table 3. Brain Regions Showing Effect of Ignoring vs.
Following the Expert’s Advice in the Message Condition.
L/R Structure BA Volume RL AP IS Max t
FOLLOWED.IGNORED
R Posterior Insula 40 15 49.8 231.5 28.4 24.889
R PrecentralGyrus / FEF 4 18 49.2 27.4 48.7 24.9174
R Posterior Insula 5 15 17.6 235.1 50.3 25.3276
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 5 8.4 27.8 60 24.3113
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 6 14.5 22 69.5 24.0575
IGNORED.FOLLOWED
L Anterior Insula 47 21 230.3 20.5 29 4.9924
R Globus Pallidus 6 15.5 2 25.1 4.9392
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.t003
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probability weighting functions (NPRR, [26]). Specifically, we
found that regions showing significant correlations with probability
exhibited flattened NPRRs in the MES condition relative to the
NOM condition. This effect was reflected in significantly lower
NPRRs in the MES condition for probabilities above 80%.
In previous work, we demonstrated the presence of nonlinear
probability weighting functions in a network of areas when
probabilistic information about an impending electrical shock was
provided [26]. Here, we extend our previous results by
demonstrating (a) the presence of nonlinear probability weighting
in the context of financial decision-making (that is, in which money
is the reward medium) and, importantly, (b) that neurobiological
probability response ratios are significantly biased by our
experimental manipulation – advice from a ‘‘satisficing’’ expert
economist. In the current study, areas showing significant
correlations with nonlinear probability weighting included the
anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral PFC,
thalamus and medial occipital gyrus. Regions within this network
also showed significantly flattened NPRRs in the presence of
expert advice, especially at higher probabilities. These results
confirm findings from previous research demonstrating nonlinear
probability weighting in anterior cingulate cortex [23,26].
Similarly, the anterior insula has repeatedly been implicated in
risky decision-making and is thought to encode the negatively
valenced affective aspects involved in risk [39,40,41,42].
Offloading to areas associated with mentalizing in the
MESSAGE condition
Recruitment of valuation processes reflective of reward
magnitude and probability weighting was greatly attenuated in
the MES condition. Together with our behavioral results, these
findings indicate that the presence of the expert’s advice
significantly altered the decision-making process. During the
presence of the expert’s advice, a network of brain regions was
active that included areas associated with mentalizing others’
intentions, such as TPJ and DMPFC (e.g. [10,39,43,44]. Further
regions showing increased activation during the presence of advice
included the caudate nucleus, a region involved in social reward
learning [45,46], the anterior insula, a region involved in risk and
negative emotional arousal ([47,48]), and lateral inferior frontal
gyrus (BA47), a region involved in inhibitory control and task
switching ([49,50]). Except for the anterior insula, these regions
did not show overlap with areas involved in making financial
choices. This activation pattern is consistent with the hypothesis
that differential evaluatory processes were engaged when advice
was provided by the expert compared to when participants made
choices independent of the expert’s advice.
Taken together, the activation pattern obtained in the presence
of the expert’s advice indicates an attenuated recruitment of
valuation mechanisms that was accompanied by significant
activations in regions associated with TOM reasoning. The TPJ,
especially in the right hemisphere, has previously been associated
with judgments of true and false beliefs that other people may hold
[10,51], as well as mental state attribution [10,14] and belief
attribution in the context of moral digressions [13]. The medial
prefrontal cortex, on the other hand, is activated in a number of
scenarios involving mentalizing [43,52,53,54,55,56,57]; for a
review see [11]), with a region of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
being engaged when mentalizing about a dissimilar other [44].
These results parallel findings from the current study. Activation
patterns in TPJ and DMPFC show increased BOLD responses in
Table 4. Brain Regions Showing Correlations with Weighted Value of Lotteries and Magnitude of Sure Win during the
NOMESSAGE (NOM) and MESSAGE (MES) conditions.
L/R Structure BA Volume RL AP IS Max t NPRR99 NOM.MES
NOMESSAGE Lottery Value
L Anterior Insula 47 15 231.4 20.8 22.1 5.058 No
L Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 14 26.2 27.7 42.9 4.7863 Yes
L Thalamus 9 20.7 213 0.6 4.3643 Yes
L Anterior Cingulate Cortex 9 7 237.7 23.6 41.2 4.6137 Yes
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 6 28.1 289.5 23.5 4.7843 Yes
NOMESSAGE Sure Win Magnitude
R IntraparietalSulcus 7 44 31.3 248.5 44.2 5.8676 Yes
L Cuneus 18 35 223.9 295.4 28.3 5.2682 Yes
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 31 32 292 21.1 4.9522 Yes
R Precuneus 19 26 29.7 264.8 40.5 4.4483 Yes
L Cuneus 30 21 211.3 273 6.4 4.4809 Yes
R Posterior Cingulate Cortex 30 13 19.6 268.8 4.4 4.3002 Yes
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 37 5 59.5 249.3 212 4.998 Yes
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 5 227 260.6 1.1 4.9919 Yes
R Posterior Cingulate Cortex 30 5 28.8 265.4 7.2 4.2667 Yes
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 9 5 40.8 7.2 30 3.9422 No
L Caudate 4 29.0 7.5 26.0 4.2107 No
MESSAGE Sure Win Magnitude
L Cuneus 18 7 227 220.1 52.7 24.204 Yes
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 4 6 258.4 235.1 25.5 24.5856 Yes
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.t004
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their involvement in belief attribution (TPJ) and reasoning about
dissimilar others (DMPFC), which is a fitting description of the
expert economist in relation to our student subject pool.
Activations in TOM areas during the presence of the expert’s
advice were accompanied by activations in regions associated with
valuation in the context of decision-making tasks, including
anterior insula and caudate nucleus. Previous research has
implicated the caudate in feedback processes that guide future
actions [58,59]. Of particular importance to the current results are
findings demonstrating that responses in the caudate are also
involved in learning about the trustworthiness of trading partners
in the context of economic games [45,46]. Such studies have
shown that responses in the caudate decreased as participants
learned to make predictions about actions from partners in a
manner consistent with a social reward-prediction error signal in
this region [46]. Furthermore, responses in the caudate have been
shown to be modulated by moral character descriptions when
participants made risky financial choices about whether to trust
trading partners in the context of a trust game [45]. In particular,
Figure 5. Valuation networks. Brain regions sensitive to weighted value of either the lottery (red probability weighting), or value of the sure win
(green, magnitude) (P,0.001). Magnitude sensitive regions were determined using a linear contrast of sure win magnitudes offered to individual
subjects. Regions sensitive to weighted lottery value were identified using a linear contrast of probability weights estimated for each individual
subject, using our behavioral decision-making model. The networks for probability weighting and sure win magnitude were largely separate, except
for overlap in occipital cortex, with parietal regions (intraparietal sulcus, precuneus), occipital cortex, as well as striatum being responsive to
magnitude. Regions associated with nonlinear probability weighting included the anterior insula, dorsolateral PFC, anterior cingulate cortex and
occipital cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.g005
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trust a trading partner when little prior information about the
partner’s character was provided (neutral description), but not so
when descriptions were informative about the trading partner’s
actions (good or bad descriptions). In view of the above findings,
results from the current study are consistent with the hypothesis
that the caudate nucleus is involved in social reward learning. It is
possible that the caudate activations observed in the presence of
the expert’s advice in the current study may reflect learning signals
about the trustworthiness of our expert.
Nonconformity with the expert
To investigate the involvement of areas in conformity with, or
independence of the expert, we probed for brain regions showing
differential responses when following vs. ignoring the expert’s
advice. Regions showing increased responses when ignoring the
expert included the anterior insula and globus pallidus, implicating
these regions in nonconforming decisions that override the expert’s
advice. Interestingly, responses of a subset of globus pallidus
neurons have recently been associated with negative reward-
related signals [60,61], which is consistent with the notion that
activity in this region may reflect a negative evaluation of the
expert’s advice.
Little is known about the neurobiological basis of conformity. In
a previous study, participants made binary perceptual decisions
about rotated 3D objects in the presence of answers provided by
either peers or a computer [15]. Conformity with the peer group
was associated with increased activations in occipital and parietal
regions, while independence of the peer group was associated with
activations in right amygdala, an area associated with negative
emotional states ([62]), and the head of the right caudate, activity
of which is associated with stimulus salience ([63,64,65]). Overall,
the findings indicate social modulation of perceptual regions
during conformity and the presence of emotional salience and
negative emotional arousal during independence.
These findings are corroborated by results from the current
study demonstrating increased responses in the anterior insula
when participants ignored the expert. The anterior insula has
repeatedly been implicated in risky decision-making and is thought
to encode the negatively valenced affective aspects involved in risk
[39,40,41,42,43]. Here we demonstrate that activity in this area
correlates with nonlinear probability weighting, as shown
previously [26]. Additionally, our results implicate this area in
evaluating the advice provided by the expert, as indicated by
increased activity in this area during the presence of the expert’s
advice and when participant’s decided to ignore the expert’s
message (Figure 4C). Thus, our findings suggest that the anterior
insula is an integrative region that assesses the risk involved in
choosing the lottery against the advice provided by the expert.
In summary, our results demonstrate that financial advice from
an expert economist, provided during decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty, had a significant impact on both
behavior and brain responses. Behavioral results showed a
significant effect of expert advice, such that probability weighting
functions changed in the direction of the expert’s advice. The
behavioral effect of expert messages was paralleled by neural
activation patterns. Specifically, (1) significant correlations with the
value of choice alternatives were obtained only in the absence of
the expert’s advice, but not during its presence. This indicates an
attenuation in the engagement of valuation processes in the
presence of expert advice; (2) during the message condition, areas
associated with mentalizing, such as DMPFC and bilateral TPJ
were recruited, and finally, (3) ROI analyses of regions associated
with probability indicated a significant ‘‘flattening’’ of neurobio-
logical probability response ratios (NPRR) in the message
condition compared to the no-message condition. This lends
further support to the hypothesis that in the presence of advice
from an expert, recruitment of valuation mechanisms was
attenuated. Taken together, these results provide significant
support for the hypothesis that one effect of expert advice is to
‘‘offload’’ the calculation of expected utility from the individual’s
brain.
Methods
Subjects
24 healthy, right-handed participants (15 females) participated
in the current study, which was approved by the Emory University
Institutional Review Board. The average age was 23 with a
standard deviation of 5.3 years. The majority of participants were
undergraduate students (17), 6 participants had graduate-level
education, 1 subject chose not to provide educational information.
All participants gave written informed consent and reported good
health with no history of psychiatric disorders.
Certainty Equivalent (CE) task
Each session of the experiment consisted of two phases. The first
phase, was conducted outside the scanner and subjects made
choices between a sure win and lotteries providing ex-ante
probabilities of winning a comparatively higher payoff, as shown
in Figure 1. The second phase proceeded in an identical fashion,
except that individuals underwent scanning and advice from an
expert economist was displayed on half the trials. The lotteries
were specified so that the probability of winning the lottery varied
across conditions (0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.37, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99). While the
amount the individual received by winning the lottery was
constant across trials (1000 units of ‘‘Yen,’’ the experimental
currency), the value of the sure win was adjusted according to
decisions made by the subject, as outlined in detail below.
In order to control for wealth effects, participants received a
chance to win cash-rewards at the end of each session by randomly
selecting one of the trials via a throw of three 10-sided dice. The
decision made on the selected trial determined payment as follows:
if the sure win was chosen on the selected trial, the respective
amount was paid to the subject; if the lottery was chosen, a
‘‘computerized coin was tossed’’ giving subjects a chance to win
1000 laboratory Yen at the probability indicated in the lottery. An
exchange rate of 1000 laboratory Yen=16 USD was established
at the beginning of the experiment, and subjects were informed of
this rate. We used 1000 YEN as the lottery amount to facilitate the
computation of the expected value of the lottery (should the
subject wish to make such a calculation).
We optimized order and timing of our experimental design for
adequate estimation of message- and probability-related responses
Figure 6. Neurobiological probability response ratios (NPRR) in representative regions showing correlations with weighted value
of lottery (Table 4). The mean ratio for each subject was computed at each probability relative to the NOM baseline, and the median across
subjects is plotted with error bars indicating the 95% confidence interval for the median. The NPRR curves are plotted with reference to the diagonal,
which indicates linear probability weighting. Significant differences between NOM and MES function, denoted with ‘‘*’’, were obtained consistently in
the 99% probability condition (see Table 4), the point at which the effect of the expert’s advice was maximal.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004957.g006
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choosing the best sequence based on a statistical efficiency
criterion. Specifically, each experimental sequence included 224
trials in 7 Probability conditions (0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.37, 0.8, 0.9,
0.99), and occurring in the presence and absence of the expert’s
advice.
As shown in Figure 1, each trial included a 3.5-second decision-
making period (based on the mean reaction time in pilot
experiments), followed by a 1-second feedback period providing
confirmatory information about which option was selected by the
participant. Finally, an intertrial interval (ITI) that was drawn
from a randomly generated exponential function with a mean of
5000 ms (range: 3000–10000 ms) was presented. At each iteration,
trial order and ITI length were pseudo-randomized (no probability
condition was repeated more than twice in a row, mean ITI length
for all conditions was equalized) for all trials in a given
experimental sequence and a design matrix was generated using
AFNI’s 3dDeconvolve script, assuming a TR of 2.5 seconds. The
sequence with the smallest mean standard deviation for regressors
of interest was chosen as the optimal sequence for use during
scanning.
Phase 1: Certainty Equivalent estimation using PEST
It has previously been argued that subjects can exhibit
inconsistent preference behaviors, show strong framing effects,
and distort reward magnitude or reward probability [67]. We
therefore employed an iterative procedure during a behavioral
pre-scanning session to obtain the best possible estimate of each
participant’s certainty equivalent (CE), or point of indifference
between a lottery and a sure win. Having an estimate of an
individual’s CEs allowed us to optimize the range of offers
presented during the scanning session. Specifically, to estimate
each participant’s CE, a modified version of the parameter
estimation by sequential testing (PEST) procedure was employed
[68,69]. This staircase algorithm started with a random offer
depending on probability condition, such that starting offers
between 0 and 500 YEN were provided in low probability
conditions (0.1–0.37) , while starting offers between 500 and 1000
YEN were provided in high probability conditions (0.8–0.99). In
order to create choice switches between sure wins and lotteries,
amounts for sure wins were adjusted as follows: whenever the
subject chose the sure win, the amount offered on the next trial
was decreased by step-size, e; whenever the subject chose the
lottery, the amount of the sure win offered on the next trial was
increased by e. The magnitude of e was determined by the
following 4 rules adapted from [68,69]: (1) the initial step-size was
set to 1/5 of the difference between the maximum and minimum
possible payoffs (e=200 YEN); (2) at each choice switch e was
halved; (3) e was doubled after three successive choices of the same
item; (4) values were bounded at the maximum (1000 YEN) and
the minimum payoffs (0 YEN). This was done within each
probability condition, which were presented in random order, and
separate counters kept track of choices within each probability
condition. The staircase algorithm terminated when the threshold
step-size for a given probability condition was reached. This
threshold was set to 25 YEN for all conditions, except for 0.01,
0.37 and 0.99, for which the threshold was set to 12.5 YEN. Phase
1 was conducted outside the scanner.
There are both advantages and limitations of using the PEST
procedure. One advantage is that we can generate CEs without
having to opt for an auction such as the Becker-deGroot-Marschak
(BDM) procedure, which would be difficult to implement in the
scanner. On the other hand, one disadvantage is that it is possible,
at least in principle, for the procedure to be manipulated by highly
sophisticated subjects. However, we did not observe any evidence
indicating that participants employed strategies to manipulate the
staircase procedure in order to increase their chances of winning
more money. Such a strategy would have led to a substantial
overweighting of small probabilities relative to typical levels, which
we did not find. Furthermore, during debriefing at the end of the
study, participants indicated that they had not identified any way
to engage in strategic behavior.
Phase 2: Scanning Session
Inside the scanner, subjects made choices between lotteries and
sure wins in a similar fashion as in the behavioral pre-scanning
session, except that an expert economist provided his suggestions
during half of the trials. In order to make the economist
trustworthy, participants were informed of the economist’s
credentials and achievements, as well as his preferred decision
strategy, in detailed instructions, which read as follows: ‘‘An expert
Economist (Professor Charles Noussair of the Department of
Economics at Emory University) is going to tell you his preferred
decisions on half the trials. Professor Charles Noussair, Ph.D.,
earned Bachelor’s degrees in Economics and Psychology from the
University of Pennsylvania, and Master’s and Doctorate Degrees
from the California Institute of Technology. He has taught at
Purdue and Emory Universities, and been a visiting professor in
Australia, Japan, France, and the Netherlands. He has consulted
for NASA, the Federal Reserve and the French ministry of
Agriculture and has published numerous articles in high-impact
peer-reviewed scientific journals.’’ None of the participants had
been acquainted with Charles Noussair previously.
The expert’s suggestions followed approximately a satisficing
rule, which were, in part, consistent with those of a decision-maker
trying to maximize his probability of winning at least 200YEN.
Specifically, in trials in which the sure win was below 200YEN, the
expert’s advice was the option that maximized expected value. In
trials in which the sure win was greater or equal to 200YEN, the
expert advised acceptance of the sure win. Suggestions were
displayed at the top of the screen via placing the word ‘‘ACCEPT’’
above the recommended option, and ‘‘REJECT’’ above the option
not recommended (see Figure 1). In the other half of the trials, the
word ‘‘UNAVAILABLE’’ was displayed above both options, to
indicate that the economist’s recommendations were not provided
on that trial. Participants were instructed to pay attention to and
consider the expert’s recommendations, but to make choices based
on which option they considered most attractive.
During phase 2, the sure win magnitudes were based on CEs
estimated during phase 1, and differed for each subject.
Specifically, sure win magnitudes were selected randomly from
the interval [CE2(0.4 * CE), CE+(0.4 * (1000-CE))], except for
eight of the subjects, for which sure win magnitudes were provided
by CE60.2 * CE and CE60.4 * CE (the discretized range was
changed to a random sampling of the interval to provide better
coverage of the offer space).
To allow for potential changes in CE which might occur if
participants followed the expert advice during the scanning
session, an attenuated version of the staircase algorithm was
employed during phase 2 as well. This was done to ensure an
adequate number of offers both above and below the subject’s CE,
even if the CE changed during the course of the experiment. This
staircase algorithm tracked extreme behaviors, such that CEs in a
given probability condition were adjusted when subjects deviated
from expected behavior. Specifically, CEs were decreased by J of
the difference between CE and sure win magnitude in a given
probability condition when participants accepted a sure win that
was lower than CE, while CEs were increased by J of the
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chose to reject a sure win that was larger than the CE of the
current probability condition. This adaptive algorithm tracked
changes in probability weighting during the scanning session,
which (1) ensured that sure win magnitudes were based on current
decision-making parameters by accounting for potential changes
in probability weighting that might occur as a function of context
change (such as scanner environment, presence of expert,
experienced outcome after completion of PEST procedure) and
(2) provided a method for estimating the effects of expert messages
on probability weighting that is independent of our behavioral
decision making model outlined below.
Decision Making Model
Empirical evidence suggests that decisions under risk are
typically consistent with the transformation of objective probabil-
ity, p, by a function, w(p), which has an inverted S-shape [6,7,8,9],
with w(p).p for p,p*, w(p),p for p.p*, and p*<0.37. Probability
weighting has been integrated as a key factor in several theories of
choice under risk, including prospect and cumulative prospect
theory [5,70], as well as rank dependent utility theory [71].
We employed nonlinear logistic regression to estimate each
participant’s probability weighting and utility functions from their
binary decisions (lottery or sure-win) using a modified version of
Prelec’s compound invariant form [8] with additional parameters
estimating the effect of the message on probability weighting. In
each trial, the participant had a choice between a sure win (SW)
and a lottery. According to Prospect Theory, the value of the
lottery is given by giw(pi)U(xi). Let W, be the difference in utility
between the lottery and the sure win in each trial. We take this
difference as the main determinant of our behavioral decision-
making model.:
W~wP ðÞ | 1000c{SWc ð1Þ
where, on a given trial, P is the probability of winning the lottery,
SW reflects the value of the sure win and c reflects the curvature of
the utility function. w(P) was modeled using a modified version of
Prelec’s compound invariant form, such that
wP ðÞ ~exp {b {log P ðÞ
az d m ðÞ z l r ðÞ
  no
ð2Þ
where m is a dummy variable indicating the presence (1) or
absence (0) of an expert message and d captures the effect of
message on a, r is run number and l is a learning parameter. We
will refer to w(P)61000
c as the Weighted Walue of the lottery to an
individual. The learning parameter was included to allow for the
possibility that the expert advice affected decision-making across
all trials, including non-message trials. The probability of choosing
the lottery (Pl) was estimated using a logistic regression
specification:
Pl~exp W fg = 1zexp W fg ðÞ ð 3Þ
where Pl is the probability of choosing the lottery. Parameters were
estimated for each subject using the least squares curve fit function
in Matlab. Starting parameters were obtained for a, b, d, l, and c
by iterating through a matrix of starting parameters varying
between [21 1.5] and choosing those starting parameters that
minimized residuals for each subject. Finally, decision weights,
w(P), were obtained for each subject separately. Decision weights
were (a) used as parametric modulators in neuroimaging analyses
and (b) entered into a random effects behavioral group-level model
that used nonlinear regression to obtain decision weights as a
function of the presence of the expert’s advice using Prelec’s
compound invariant form with additional parameters for each
participant’s a and d, where d captures the influence of the
message on a:
wP ðÞ ~exp {b {log P ðÞ
az d m ðÞ
  no
ð4Þ
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Neuroimaging
data were collected using a 3 Tesla Siemens Magnetron Trio
whole body scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen,
Germany). A three dimensional, high-resolution anatomical data
set was acquired using Siemens’ magnetization prepared rapid
acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence (TR of 2300 ms,
TE of 3.93 ms, TI of 1100 ms, 1 mm isotropic voxels and a
256 mm FOV). Functional data consisted of thirty-five axial slices
that were sampled with a thickness of 3 mm and encompassing a
field of view of 192 mm with an inplane resolution of 64664 (T2*
weighted, TR=2500 ms, TE=31 ms). The task was presented
with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany,
CA) and visual stimuli were projected onto a frosted glass screen,
which the subject viewed through an angled mirror mounted to
the head coil. Inhomogeneities in the magnetic field introduced by
the participant were minimized with a standard two-dimensional
head shimming protocol before each run and the anatomical data
acquisition. In our dataset, each participant completed 4 runs with
56 trials, whose length depended on participants’ decision time.
fMRI Data Analysis
fMRI Preprocessing. Initial preprocessing of the data was
conducted using Analysis of Functional Neuroimages (AFNI,
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). Data underwent slice-time
acquisition correction using Fourier interpolation. The functional
data were then spatially aligned to the volume acquired closest to
each subject’s anatomical image. After motion correction,
anatomical and mean functional datasets were manually co-
registered. Individual gray matter tissue probability maps (TPMs)
were computed from anatomical datasets and spatially warped to
standard MNI space using the VBM5 toolbox (http://dbm.neuro.
uni-jena.de/vbm) running in SPM5 (http://fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
software/spm5). Normalization to standard MNI space was
conducted in SPM5 by applying the transformation matrix
obtained from normalizing the anatomical data set to the
functional data using quintic interpolation. Functional data then
underwent spatial smoothing using an isotropic Gaussian kernel
(full width at half maximum (FWHM)=6 mm). Finally, each
voxel’s signal intensity was scaled to a mean of 100.
fRMI Analysis. FMRI data were analyzed using the General
Linear Model and a standard two-stage mixed effects analysis.
Trials were classified according to type of decision made by
participants. Specifically, responses were sorted according to
whether participants followed or ignored the expert’s advice in the
message condition (MES), while in the no message condition
(NOM) responses were sorted according to whether participants’
would have followed or ignored the expert’s advice had it been
shown. The latter conditions were included in the analyses in
order to control for potential learning effects across message
conditions. First-level multiple regression models consisted of 4
regressors of interest, modeling the presence/absence of expert
choice and type of decision made by the subject. Two additional
regressors were included in each condition in the form of
Expert Financial Advice
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 March 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 3 | e4957parametric modulators predictive of (1) amount of sure win
magnitude (SW) offered on each trial, and (2) decision weights,
w(P), reflective of subjective distortions of actual probabilities as
estimated by the behavioral decision-making model outlined
above. Of note, parametric modulators were tailored to each
subject’s level of risk attitude. Because we were interested mainly
in the effects of expert messages on probability weighting, we
orthogonalized the regressors reflecting parametric modulation by
w(P) relative to regressors reflecting parametric modulation by SW
within each condition. This procedure generated new regressors
within each condition whose variance in w(P) is not explained by
SW. All first-level statistical models included additional regressors
of no interest for each run to model slow signal drifts (constant and
polynomial terms), to account for residual head motion (roll, pitch,
yaw, and displacement in superior, left and posterior directions)
and one regressor to model the 1-second feedback period
presented after each decision.
To localize regions involved in processing the presence of the
expert (MES main effect), a random effects model was imple-
mented at the second level as separate paired two-sample t-tests
contrasting the beta images corresponding to 1) presence and the
absence of the MES and 2) ignoring the expert and following the
expert in the MES condition only. Finally, to probe for brain
regions associated with valuation processes (probability weighting
and magnitude of sure win), correlation contrasts were performed
with separate one-sample t-tests on parametric modulators in MES
and NOM conditions. All t-maps were thresholded at an
uncorrected p-value of 0.001 with a cluster size threshold of
k.5, except for striatal areas for which a cluster size threshold of
k.4 was employed.
ROI analysis of regions showing conformity and
independence with the expert. To extract the temporal
dynamics within regions showing a significant response when
subjects followed or ignored the expert’s advice in the MES
condition, a different first-level model was fitted to each
participant’s fMRI data. In this model, the hemodynamic
response during MES and CHOICE was modeled with a basis
set of seven cubic spline functions spaced one TR (2.5 s) apart and
spanning the interval from 0 to 15 seconds post trial onset. In
order to create reconstructed event-related responses on a 1 s
temporal grid, the set of fitted spline functions was resampled at a
temporal resolution of 1 second and averaged within each ROI as
a function of the following condition of interest: MESfollowed,
MESignored and NOM.
Neurobiological probability response ratio (NPRR). The
above whole-brain analysis probed for regions encoding non-linear
probability weighting and sure win magnitude. To illustrate fMRI
responses within structures associated with valuation, and,
importantly, differences in probability weighting as a function of
the expert’s advice, we analyzed the ROI activations using a
previously developed method of transforming neural activations to
a neural analog of the probability weighting function. Specifically,
we were interested in how the NPRR, the relationship between
neural activation and probability of a given outcome, was affected
by the presence of the expert’s advice. This model was only used in
areas already identified by the aforementioned contrasts. We
converted mean activations reflecting signal change to
neurobiological probability response ratios (NPRR) following
methods described in detail in Berns et al. (2008). According to
prospect tgheory, the probability weighting function, w(p), is a
monotonic function that is bounded by [0,1] in both domain and
range. The function transforms an objective probability, p, into a
weight based on subjective factors when evaluating a lottery. An
equivalent function based on fMRI responses can be obtained via
transforming neural responses to the presentation of a probability,
y(p). We assume that a null outcome, such as a payoff of zero,
occurs with probability 12p. The NPRR function is given by
NPRR(p)=y(p)/y(1), where y(1) is the fMRI response to a lottery
with p=1. Because fMRI responses do not represent absolute
physical quantities, a baseline response was defined as the BOLD
response during the NOM condition at p=0.37. This is
approximately the point at which the probability weighting
function crosses the identity function, as demonstrated by
various behavioral studies [5,6,70,72,73]. This choice of baseline
controls for various psychological and physiological processes
associated with low-level processing of the stimuli [26]. The value
of y(1), at outcomes which are certain, was approximated by the
mean beta value of the BOLD response for those trials in the
NOM condition in which the probability of winning the lottery
was 0.99. The restrictions that yNOM(.99)=1 and yNOM (.37)=.37
yield the following NPRR:
NPRR p ðÞ ~0:63  yp ðÞ {yNOM 37
yNOM 99{yNOM 37
z0:37 ð5Þ
NPRRs, were estimated separately for mean BOLD responses
during both the message and no message conditions. As in [26],
the median of the means were employed to estimate central
tendency and a 95% confidence interval was obtained to estimate
statistical significance using the following equation: [(N+1)/
2]61.96*(!N)/2 [74].
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